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THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND
EMPLOYMENT DISLOCATION*
in a global economy where goods can be sourced in low-wage Third World
countries, the effective supply of unskilled workers has expanded enormously.
As a consequence, wages must fall for the unskilled who live in rich countries.
Quite simply, supply and demand require it. In a global economy a worker has
two things to offer- skills or the willingness to work for low wages.'
On February 26, 1993, President Bill Clinton gave the first major interna-
tional trade policy address of his administration. The President argued in favor
of expanding foreign trade through the reduction of trade barriers, 2 and dra-
matically labelled the current period of United States history as the "third great
moment of decision in the 20th Century. ' 3 Although his position is fundamentally
in step with the objectives of the Bush Administration, President Clinton distin-
guished his policy on an issue that has long divided Democrats and Republicans4
on free trade: what provisions should be made to assist those workers who will
inevitably be displaced as our economy becomes more internationally integrated.5
The President voiced his support for the North American Free Trade Agreement,
6
but that support has been conditioned on, among other things, the development
of a mechanism that will dull the blow to American workers who stand to lose
their jobs as a result of the freer trade created by the NAFTA.
* The authors wish to thank Michael S. Berman for his guidance in the preparation of this
Note.
1. LESTER C. THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING EcoNoMIc BATTLE AMONG JAPAN, EUROPE,
AND AMERICA 52 (1992).
2. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Vol. 29
No.8, Remarks on the Global Economy at American University, 320 (1993) [hereinafter WEEKLY
COMPILATION]. "[Our trade policy] will say to our trading partners that we value their business, but
none of us should expect something for nothing. We will continue to welcome foreign products and
services into our markets, but insist that our products and services be able to enter theirs on equal
terms." Id.
3. Id. at 321. The President never explicitly identified the other two great moments of decision
of this century. He did allude to the post-World War I period as the first ("Will we repeat the
mistakes of the 1920's and 1930's by turning inward?"), and the post-World War II period as the
second ("Or will we repeat the successes of the 1940's and 1950's by reaching outward and improving
ourselves as well?"). Id.
4. In a precursor to the current Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Congress drafted
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987. President Ronald Reagan vetoed the legislation
on the basis of a provision that would require employers that met certain size criteria to give 60 days
notice of a plant closing. The irony is that Congress, while foiled on the trade bill, enacted in
separate legislation the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379,
102 Stat. 890 (1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (Aug. 4, 1988)) [hereinafter WARN]. This
was the aspect of the trade legislation to which the President objected.
5. WEEKLY COMPILATION, supra note 2, at 324. "We have got to focus on how to help people
adapt to these changes, how to maintain a high wage economy in the United States without ourselves
adding to the protectionist direction that so many of the developed nations have taken in the last
few years." Id.
6. The North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA].
265
Journal of Legislation
This Note addresses those factors which differentiate the NAFTA from the
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement7 in terms of its impact on U.S.
employment. Specifically, the inclusion of Mexico in the free trade agreement
introduces a potential for the loss of labor-intensive jobs in the U.S. This Note
explores this possibility and analyzes the methods of coping with the dislocation
of U.S. workers due to the NAFTA. Part II of this Note outlines the Canada
Free Trade Agreement as a foundation for understanding the effects of free trade
with our North American neighbors. The history, nature of the agreement, and
its distinguishable employment effects provide an empirical model of free trade
between two similarly situated countries. Part III examines the past and present
policies of Mexico which prompted the proposal of the NAFTA. This section
also examines the maquiladora industry as a small scale model of what free trade
with Mexico might entail. Part IV establishes the need for measures which deal
with the dislocation of U.S. workers regardless of whether there is a net gain or
loss of jobs as a result of the NAFTA. It further outlines the various programs
already in effect which might serve to lessen the impact of job dislocation.
Finally, this section contains a series of recommendations which could help
transform that portion of the U.S. workforce which receives low wages for labor-
intensive work into higher skilled, knowledge-intensive workers. This would enable
the U.S. to better compete in the global economy. The U.S. can achieve this
through a combination of application of existing laws and by alerting workers
in sectors that will likely be impacted by the NAFTA of the forthcoming changes
in employment opportunity.
I. THE CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT8
Trade between Canada and the United States is the greatest of any two
nations in the world. 9 As stated in its preamble, the goals of the CFTA include
increased productivity and employment, increased market access for goods and
services of each country, and strengthened standing for Canada and the United
States in global trade.10 This section will begin by charting the history of the two
7. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 293 [hereinafter
CFTA].
8. The CFTA was signed by President Ronald Reagan and Canadian Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney on January 1, 1988, ratified by the United States Congress in the fall of that year, and
became effective on January 1, 1989. P.L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (Sept. 28, 1988).
9. In 1991 the total trade between the U.S. and Canada amounted to over $176 billion; Japan-
U.S. trade amounted to nearly $140 billion; Mexico was the third largest trading partner at over $64
billion; Germany and Great Britain round out the top five U.S. trading partners, at $47.5 billion
and $40.6 billion, respectively. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
1992 (112th edition) 1992.
10. Id. The full text is as follows:
PREAMBLE
The Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America,
resolved:
TO STRENGTHEN the unique and enduring friendship between their two nations;
TO PROMOTE productivity, full employment, and a steady improvement of living
standards in their respective countries;
TO CREATE an expanded and secure market for their goods and services produced in
their territories;
TO ADOPT clear and mutually advantageous rules governing their trade;
TO ENSURE a predictable commercial environment for business planning and invest-
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nations as trading partners and then will examine the role the employment debate
played during negotiation of the agreement. This is done to set the foundation
for analysis of the NAFTA."
A. History of Canada - United States Trade
There is a long record of trade competition and limited cooperation between
Canada and the United States as a result of shared history and common roots.
One example of this link was the "Loyalist" settlements of the three "Maritime
Provinces,"' 2 in which an estimated 40,000 colonist troops, aligned with the
British in the American revolution, took refuge in Canada after the British
defeat.' 3 Throughout the first one hundred years of the United States, "migrants
ebbed and flowed [between the United States and Canada] as opportunity
dictated.' '1 4 But this freedom of exchange of culture was not matched by free
trade in commerce.
Throughout this period, formal cooperation did not exist. Tariffs imposed
by both sides prevented Canadian-American trade from flourishing. The catalyst
for the first trade agreement between these two nations 5 was a global depression
in the 1840's. There is evidence, however, that the two nations reacted differently
to this economic environment; Canada realized it needed greater market access
while the trend in America was to preserve advantageous demographics by closing
out foreign competitors.' 6 Therefore, it was the Canadians who pursued the first
formal agreement on trade in the latter part of the decade.
The result of this effort was the Elgin-Marcy Treaty of 1854.'7 This agreement
was short lived. It created duty free status mainly for natural products while
ment;
TO STRENGTHEN the competitiveness of Canadian and United States firms in global
markets;
TO REDUCE government-created trade distortions while preserving the Parties' flexi-
bility to safeguard the public welfare;
TO BUILD on their mutual rights and obligations under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and other multilateral and bilateral instruments of cooperation; and
TO CONTRIBUTE to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade and
to provide a catalyst to broader international cooperation;
HAVE AGREED as follows ....
Id.
11. There is an obvious distinction between Canada and Mexico. Therefore, it is difficult to
project results from the former agreement to forecast the potential effects of the latter. But because
the NAFTA is fundamentally equivalent to the CFTA, and because no closer analogy is available,
the CFTA will be used as basis by which measurement of the NAFTA and its effect on the United
States will be made.
12. New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia.
13. ROBERT BOTHWELL, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: THE POLITICS OF PARTNERSHIP 3 (1992).
14. Id. at 5. "The flow was assisted by the fact that aspects of basic life were essentially the
same on either side of the border." Id.
15. At this time Canada was still a colony of Great Britain.
16. GILBERT R. WINHAM, TRADNa WITH CANADA: THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
5 (1988). This can be explained by the difference in population; the United States market was, and
still is, much larger than the Canadian market. The Americans believed that they could thrive by
selling within their borders and it was advantageous to shut out foreign competition. The Canadians,
on the other hand, realized that their population was too small to support a prosperous economy.
To a certain extent, these feelings still prevail.
17. Reciprocity Treaty with Great Britain, June 5, 1854, U.S.-U.K., Vol. X Statutes at Large
and Treaties of the U.S. at 1089 (1855).
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manufactured goods remained heavily tariffed. Thus, because the United States
was more industrialized, the agreement favored the Canadians. Indeed, it is
estimated that under the accord only 55% of American exports arrived in Canada
duty free while fully 90% of Canadian goods reached American markets that
way. 8 The death knell of the accord was its uneven terms and the American
Civil War.19 In 1866 the United States abrogated the Treaty. This period was
fondly remembered by Canadians for its economic rejuvenation.20
The next stage of interaction was prompted by the withdrawal of the United
States from the Reciprocity Treaty. The Canadians responded with a policy of
heightened tariffs. The theory behind this approach was to protect Canadian
manufacturing in order to allow growth. This posture towards the United States
was embodied in the National Policy of 1879, and its effect was to create a
manufacturing sector that became dependent on the protection. Because of this
dependence, and the nationalistic feelings it generated, it became politically
difficult to oppose the tariffs. 2' This period of cold trade relations prevailed until
1934,22 despite sporadic efforts at reconciliation in the interim. 23
The opening of negotiations on a trade pact came with the passage of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Aside from the important expression
of good will, the 1934 Act had minimal impact. It resulted in only two limited
bilateral agreements, one in 1935 and another in 1938.24 The final foray of note
in this area prior to the CFTA was the Canada-U.S. Automotive Products Trade
Agreement of 1965.23 This was an effort to protect the young Canadian automobile
industry, which was based primarily on American corporate subsidiaries. While
the pact seemed more favorable to the Canadians, it is alleged that the concession
was made in order for the United States to gain a foot-hold on free trade with
the goal of expanding market by market. 26
18. WINHAM, supra note 16, at 4.
19. The impact of the American Civil War was a wave of nationalism, protectionism and ill will
towards Great Britain for their support of the south. Ann Carlsen, Note, The Canada United States
Free Trade Agreement: A Bilateral Approach to the Reduction of Trade Barriers, 12 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L.J. 299 (1989).
20. BOTHWELL, supra note 13, at 6. "[T]he 1850's and 1860's seemed an era of prosperity and
abundance: to later generations of Canadians, reciprocity with the United States was a prescription
for affluence." Id.
21. On the other side of the border, feelings were mutual. As a result, half of all Canadian
exports were shipped to the United States in 1888; that figure fell to 27% in ten years. Id. at 7.
22. One extreme manifestation of this period of poor relations was the Tariff Act of 1930,
known as the Smoot-Hawley Act. This legislation raised tariffs on most articles imported into the
United States. Smoot-Hawley is now synonymous with protectionism and is largely frowned upon as
an over-reactionary measure. This policy was met with matching protectionism by the Canadians.
DEnRA P. STEGER, A CONCISE GUIE TO THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 125
(1988).
23. One such invitation came from the Americans in 1911, and another, in 1922, by the
Canadians. WINtAM, supra note 16, at 5. Relations had deteriorated in 1911 to the point that then
Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier was defeated in an election held pursuant to a reciprocity treaty
he had negotiated with President William Howard Taft. BOTHWELL, supra note 13, at 8.
24. WINHAM, supra note 16, at 5.
25. Canada-U.S. Automotive Products Trade Agreement of 1965, Sept. 16, 1966, T.I.A.S. No.
6093, at 1372. This agreement is also referred to as "Autopact."
26. BOTHWELL, supra note 13, at 93. "The auto agreement was generally regarded as successful;
trade in this sector has increased by twenty-four times [between 1965 and 1988], and [in 1988]
account[edl for more than one-third of all U.S.-Canadian trade." WuiNHA, supra note 16, at 6.
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B. Negotiation of the CFTA
The starting point for the CFTA was March 17, 1985.27 On that date President
Reagan met Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in Ottawa and agreed to explore the
possibility of a trade agreement. 28 In the early stages, the Canadians pushed for
the negotiations; 29 on September 26, 1985 Mulroney announced to the Canadian
Parliament that his administration would pursue negotiation of a free trade
agreement.
From the United States' perspective, the agreement would have to be nego-
tiated pursuant to section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974.30 This act was designed
to alleviate the constitutional tension that accrued when international trade
agreements were negotiated. Under the constitutional scheme, the legislative
branch has authority to regulate commerce3 while the executive branch, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, has authority to negotiate treaties.3 2 The result
of the 1974 Trade Act was a hybrid of authority; a "fast track" procedure was
designed which permits the president to negotiate trade agreements, under certain
constraints, while the Congress has the authority to approve or veto the agreement
as it stands and may not change the document.
The first formal step for both countries was the appointment of chief
negotiators. President Reagan named Peter Murphy, the United States ambassador
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,33 and Prime Minister Mulroney
picked Simon Reisman, a former member of the Department of Finance.14 The
negotiators' first meeting took place on May 21, 1986, and the remaining
negotiation can be broken down into four stages. During the first stage, working
groups were formed and general discussions were held over the scope of the
agreement. 5 The second stage consisted of seventeen formal bargaining sessions,
which ended in discord as the Canadian team announced the end of the talks on
September 23, 1987. Reisman argued that the United States was not responding
27. This is the first date that the two nations met to discuss trade relations with the end result
of the CFTA. Another important early development was the election of Mulroney in September 1984.
While the liberal government his administration displaced had explored the possibility of trade
negotiations only one year earlier, it decided not to pursue the issue. Mulroney found trade talks a
legitimate goal and initiated the dialogue early in his tenure. Id. at 24.
28. BOTHWELL, supra note 13, at 145. This meeting in Ottawa is known as the "Shamrock
Summit." WNHnAM, supra note 16, at 24. The understanding reached at Ottawa was the Declaration
on Trade in Goods and Services, a declaration by both countries to pursue a trade agreement. Id.
29. Evidence, again, of which party had more at stake.
30. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
33. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
34. WINHAM, supra note 16, at 25. These appointments created early tension as the Canadians
believed that the United States representative was not senior enough. To the Canadians, this was
evidence that the U.S. was not taking the trade talks seriously. BOTHWELL, supra note 13, at 146.
35. WINtAM, supra note 16, at 26. At this early stage it was apparent that the two sides had
different objectives.
Canada based its approach on the principle of 'national treatment.' which would have
meant the Canadian goods would receive the same treatment in the United States as
goods produced there ....
The U.S. government had no equivalent grand plan for negotiation. It viewed the
deal more as an addition to the GATT than as a new economic constitution between
the two North American partners.
Id. at 26-27.
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to the concerns raised by Canada. 6 This led to the third stage, during which the
United States was prompted to appoint Secretary of the Treasury James Baker
and Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter as negotiators. Baker invited the
Canadians to meet to restart negotiations. While there were still points of
contention, the two parties were able to agree on the broader issues and nego-
tiations resumed. The final stage started on October 5, 1987 and ended on
December 11; during that period the document was drafted.37 The agreement was
signed by Reagan and Mulroney on January 1, 1988.
In light of the history of relations between, the two nations and particularly
in light of the recent emphasis on the virtue of a free market by the Reagan-
Bush and Mulroney platforms, it is no surprise that the most fundamental
objective of a free trade agreement is market access.3" Because of their heavy
reliance on exports to the United States for economic security, eliminating trade
barriers is essential to Canada. 9 Keeping markets open is a goal for the United
States as well, though not at the same level of urgency. 40 In addition, the CFTA
is perceived as the mechanism by which investments can overcome protectionist
policies of the past. 4'
The CFTA is a comprehensive free trade area agreement that was developed
in compliance with Article XXIV of GATT, a convention to which both nations
belong. A free trade area is generally inconsistent with the policy of GATT which
is, generally stated, to reduce trade barriers unilaterally as opposed to the
formation of bilateral trade agreements with preferential treatment among select
partners. 42 GATT Article XXIV allows for such trade agreements provided certain
conditions are met.4 3 Many of the provisions of GATT are incorporated by
reference into the CFTA." In addition to incorporation by reference, some of
the GATT principles have been included by "affirmation"; in this situation, the
GATT provision is not within the CFTA but the reader must look to GATT for
the rules and implications of any affirmance. The basic rule regarding the CFTA
36. The impasse was arbitration remedies that the Canadiahs wanted as part of the agreement.
The United States would not allow existing trade law to be superseded by the CFTA. Id. at 32.
37. Id. at 34-35.
38. Even Democrats in Congress agreed with this policy: "[A] key beneficiary of this agreement
is the consumer on both sides of the border. Increased openness of United States and Canadian
markets means increased competition for an expanded customer base. Both United States and Canadian
businesses had better be ready to compete for a consumer who will have more choices. Those that
succeed, will grow and, in turn, strengthen the economies of both nations." 134 CONG. REC. S12,885
(daily ed. Sept. 20, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
39. The attraction of reconciliation with the United States becomes even more understandable
in light of the fact that the American marketplace is more than ten times larger than Canada's.
JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE: AN EVALUATION OF THE AGREEMENT 6
(1988).
40. Again, this is due to the vast population disparity. Id.
41. CFTA, supra note 7, at § 1602.
42. JON R. JOHNSON & JOEL S. SCHACHTER, THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE 3 (1988).
43. The conditions of GATT Article XXIV are: first, substantially all trade barriers between the
members of the agreement are removed, second, that new and higher trade restrictions cannot be
promulgated for nations outside the agreement, and third, that the contracting parties must notify
other GATT member nations. Id. at 4. The CFTA met these guidelines.
44. For example, CFTA, supra note 7, at § 501 (incorporating Article III of GATT); Id. at §
602 (incorporating the GATT "Technical Barriers Code"); Id. at § 1303 (incorporating the GATT
"Procurement Code"). JOHNSON & SCHACHTER, supra note 42, at 7.
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and its relation to any other trade convention or agreement, including the GATT,
is that the CFTA prevails in cases of inconsistency, unless the CFTA prescribes
otherwise.
Three basic principles form the foundation of the CFTA. First is the notion
of national treatment, meaning that trade in investments, goods and services
between the two nations are to be treated as if they are domestic.45 There are
certain exceptions, but this notion provides the framework for the reduction of
barriers to trade. The second principle is reciprocity, a recognition of and respect
for the fact that each partner has its own rules for regulating trade. Therefore,
the concept is to treat trade in foreign goods by the rules of the country of
origin. The third concept is harmonization, which is the effort by the CFTA to
standardize certain trade practices of the two nations."
The document addresses a broad range of goods, services and investments.
Because of its broad sweep, and in order to allow a smooth transition to the
more competitive and integrated market, there is a phase-in period of up to ten
years for many products. 47 While most tariffs were not particularly high before
the effective date of the CFTA, some industries did have high tariffs.4 Once the
CFTA becomes fully effective, it will create greater market access and force
businesses to be more competitive with firms from the other side of the border,
and should create greater efficiency. The net result will be greater productivity
and trade, with some displacement for those that cannot compete in the new
environment. 49
C. The CFTA Employment Debate
One of the most divisive issues facing the NAFTA in the United States is
the prospect that jobs will flow to the country with the cheapest labor as
manufacturers seek to reduce costs of production. The greatest disparity exists
in Mexico where labor standards are significantly lower than in either Canada
or the United States.50 The jobs debate prevailed in the negotiation of the CFTA
as well, although the conflict was along different lines. Because the labor standards
of Canada and the United States were significantly more in line than is the case
with Mexico, the fear was not a flight of industry to either country for cheap
45. CFTA, supra note 7, at § 105.
46. JOHNSON & SCHACHTER, supra note 42, at 6.
47. Carlsen, supra note 19, at 311. For example, computers, vending machines, aluminum, fur,
animal feed and motor cycles were made duty free at the outset on January 1, 1989. Other products,
such as paper, auto parts, chemicals, textiles, plywood and steel will not become fully duty free until
January 1, 1998. CFTA, supra note 7, at § 401.2.
48. SCHorr, supra note 39, at 20. Those industries with protective tariffs will generally have the
longer phase in period. Id. One example of an industry with high tariffs prior to the agreement was
the "printed materials" industry. In 1987, it was a $3 billion industry, and more than half of its
total export, $750 million, went to Canada. The duty on printed materials prior to the agreement
was up to 10%, and stood to be phased out in five years. 134 CONG. REC. S12,885 (daily ed. Sept.
7, 1988). Another example of a sector with high tariffs was the telecommunications equipment
industry which, prior to the CFTA, faced duties of up to 17.8%. Id. at S12,884.
49. SCHOTT, supra note 39, at 5. In addition to increased trade among Canada and the United
States, trade with third party countries should, over time, also increase because of the increase in
efficiency.
50. GARY C. HUFDAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 107 (1992).
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labor. The concern was over the very goal of the accord, freer competition.
Therefore, opponents argued that the risk was not simply over potential harm
to the worker but the fear of closure of entire industries that relied on protection
from Canadian competition.
During the debate over the CFTA in Congress, this conflict between greater
efficiency and job loss surfaced. While no one is on the record against the
prospect of increased competition and efficiency,5 lawmakers must always be
aware of the potential job loss in their districts.5 2
The employment debate started well before the CFTA was introduced to the
Congress. In an effort to "dispel trade myths;" Representative Richard Armey
cited an economist's analysis of the free trade issue. This perspective was applied
not only to potential free trade with Canada, but also as a rebuttal to those
members of Congress who advocated becoming more protectionist.53 The Rep-
resentative outlined six reasons why the United States should not become more
protective, four of which directly addressed the employment issue.54 The most
pertinent point to this discussion was the fifth: "Myth No. 5 - Protectionism
is the way to save jobs." The rebuttal was that because protectionism increases
the cost of producing goods, many ancillary industries will not be able to compete
because their costs will be increased. The net-effect is to save jobs in the beginning
of the chain, for example steel manufacturing jobs, but lose jobs downstream
due to the higher costs of materials, like in the automotive industry.55
As the potential for trade negotiations with the Canadians grew closer, the
debate became more focused. The impact of an agreement with Canada, as
opposed to free trade generally, surfaced. One concern expressed in the early
dialogue was that since the Canadians were taking the initiative in pushing for
an agreement, it was to their advantage to have the CFTA.5 6 Citing Prime
51. One Senator, Lloyd Bentsen, tried to play down the gain in efficiency. "This agreement will
increase our exports to Canada, but, quite frankly, opening a market one-fifth the size of Japan,
about one-tenth the size of our market, and about one-fourteenth the size of the European Common
Market is not really big bucks." 134 CoNG. REc. S12,782 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1988).
52. Senator Kerry of Massachusetts, a state heavily reliant on the manufacturing sector, projected
a gain of 14,000 jobs in that sector in the first five years of the agreement. 134 CONG. REc. S12,885
(daily ed. Sept. 20, 1988).
53. Representative Armey cited Murray Weidenbaum's analysis, printed in the Washington Times,
December 31, 1985. 132 CONG. REC. E274 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1986).
54. Myth number one was that Japan was the problem for the trade deficit; myth number two
was that the U.S. was an island in a world of protectionism; myth number three was that imports
were dragging the economy down and depressing employment; myth number four was that imports
were the main reason for unemployment in key industries; myth number five was that protectionism
was a way to save jobs; and myth number six was that workers in import affected industries should
receive preferential treatment. 132 CONG. REC. E274 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1986).
55. Id. at E275.
A recent study shows that if the United States had imposed a 15 per cent import quota
on steel in 1984, as the steel industry sought, 26,000 steel worker jobs could have been
saved - but at a cost of 93,000 jobs in steel-using industries. Higher prices for steel
would have made American automobiles and durable goods less competitive.
Id.
56. "Unlike our two principal trading partners, Japan and the United States, Canada does not
possess a large internal market. Unlike European countries Canada does not have preferred access
to a larger market through regional trading blocks." 132 CONG. REc. S3054 (daily ed. Mar. 19,
1986) (statement of Senator Chafee citing the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Allen E.
Gotlieb).
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Minister Mulroney's address to Canada on the eve of the trade talks, Represen-
tative Bereuter noted that Mulroney would only sign an agreement that led to
more jobs and greater prosperity for all Canadians. The Representative did not
see any commitment on behalf of President Reagan to such concerns.
5 7
The other perspective was that protectionism may save jobs in the short run,
but that the lower efficiency leads to reduced prosperity for all Americans. This
was the argument of Representative Leach, analogizing the policy of prohibiting
internal trade barriers of the Founding Fathers to the potential agreement with
Canada. Our economy would be half as strong, the argument went, if we had
"domestic protectionism.""8 By opening the border to free trade, both nations'
economies would blossom. These sentiments were shared by members of both
parties in the United States Congress.59 Although it had to be politically hedged,
most members of Congress supported a trade agreement with Canada. While
there was a good chance of job displacement, the economics argued persuasively
in favor of the CFTA.
II. THE MEXICAN ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE
Implementation of the NAFTA requires taking into account many factors
which were not at issue in the drafting of the CFTA. The CFTA provides a
glimpse of what free trade with our North American neighbors entails; and yet
because the U.S. and Canada are economically similarly situated, it is necessary
to gain insight into Mexico's economic agenda to assess the potential impact of
the NAFTA. This section will examine the dramatic policy changes Mexico has
embraced which have lead to the proposal of the NAFTA. This section will also
analyze the historical and current role of the maquiladora program in attracting
U.S. business operations to Mexico.
A. Import Substitution And The Move Towards Free Trade
Beginning in the 1930's and continuing through the early 1980's, Mexico
employed a policy of import substitution which focused on internal development.
The government fostered internal development in large part through a program
of industrial protectionism which restricted foreign investment and manipulated
the exchange rate in an effort to advance domestic growth.60 Mexico's protec-
tionism took the form of tariff and non-tariff barriers including import licensing,
quotas, domestic subsidies, and tax relief. Unfortunately, protectionism did not
help nurture domestic industry. Instead, these programs created a Mexican
industry which was inefficient and uncompetitive. 61
57. 132 CONG. REC. H4652 (daily ed. July 17, 1986).
58. 133 CONG. REc. H2839 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987).
59. For example, Representative Kemp, the New York Republican, cited an article written by
Senator. Bill Bradley, the New Jersey Democrat, which argued for the trade agreement: "As Senator
Bradley points out, a free-trade agreement with Canada would provide tremendous benefits to
American workers and consumers." 132 CONG. REc. E1308 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1986).
60. U.S. LinR. OF CONG. RES. SERVICES, REPORT No. 91-282E, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 12 (Mar. 25, 1991, updated Aug. 12, 1991) [hereinafter NAFTA:
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS]. Import licensing proved to be Mexico's primary protectionist tool. Most
products could not be legally imported into Mexico without obtaining a permiso previo. Denial of
this license amounted to the levying of an infinite tariff. Sidney Weintraub, The Promise of United
States-Mexican Free Trade, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 551, 555 (1992).
61. Jesus Silva & Richard K. Dunn, A Free Trade Agreement Between the United States and
Mexico: The Right Choice?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 937, 951-52 (1990).
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In the 1970's Mexico's inefficient domestic industry, which was predominantly
owned and controlled by the state, found itself unable to export its manufactured
goods. Additionally, during this period foreign investment in Mexico was almost
non-existent. 62 Against this bleak backdrop, substantial oil reserves were discov-
ered in Mexico. While this discovery might have seemed a panacea for Mexico's
faltering domestic industry, it led to an unhealthy dependence on oil. As world
oil prices steadily climbed, Mexico adopted ambitious developmental programs
which were funded through government spending. Oil revenues alone, however,
could not support these programs, 63 and the inefficiency of domestic industry
prevented it from narrowing this gap. As a result, Mexico borrowed heavily from
international banks which focused on its oil reserves and anticipated future
prosperity. By 1982, Mexico was on the verge of default on its loans to commercial
banks due to falling oil prices, economic mismanagement, a worldwide recession,
and rising interest rates." The severity of this problem can be appreciated when
one observes that Mexico's foreign debt rose from $6.1 billion in 1970 to $81
billion in 1982.65 The Mexican Debt Crisis of 1982 signaled the beginning of a
change in policy and practice which has culminated in the proposal of the
NAFTA.
Initial analysis of Mexico's financial difficulties suggested a short-term or
liquidity crisis, and that the solution lay in fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate
policies in conjunction with short-term financing. This program focused on the
reduction of Mexico's fiscal deficit, which had reached 16.5 percent of its Gross
Domestic Product."6 While these steps met with early success, by 1985 the fiscal
deficit was once again on the rise and Mexico was unable to remain on schedule.
As a result, there was a shift in strategy towards adopting the rationale of the
1985 Baker Plan. It addressed Mexico's debt crisis as a long-term or solvency
problem, and focused on structural reforms. Later the 1989 Brady Plan was
implemented, which focused on debt reduction. 67 These structural reforms signi-
fied a major departure from the protectionist practices of the past, and included
privatization, deregulation, tax reform, and acceptance of foreign products 6 and
investment into Mexico. Under this new agenda, Mexico joined the GATT in
June 1986.69
The adoption of free-market policies began under President Miguel de la
Madrid (1982-1988) and flourished under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari
62. 138 CONG. REC. E2192 (daily ed. July 21, 1992).
63. K. LARRY STORRS, U.S. LIBR. OF CONG., CONG. RES. SERVICES, REPORT No. IB91061,
MEXICO-U.S. RELATIONS IN THE SALINAS PERIOD (1988-1994): ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4-5 (May 29,
1991).
64. NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 60, at 15.
65. STORRS, supra note 63, at 5. An example of economic mismanagement was the failure of
Mexico to lower the value of the peso to compensate for inflation. This increased Mexico's need to
borrow, since the dollar-dominated loans were repaid with inflated pesos. Id.
66. The U.S. fiscal deficit that year was 3.4 percent of Gross Domestic Product. 138 CONG.
REC. E2192 (daily ed. Jul. 21, 1992).
67. NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 60, at 17-18.
68. The use of import licensing has been phased out with the exception of the automotive
industry and agriculture products. Weintraub, supra note 60, at 559.
69. Prior to the agreement, the maximum Mexican tariff rate on imports was 100 percent. Just
as Mexico has unilaterally lowered its import tariffs below the GATT requirement, so too could it
unilaterally raise them to the prescribed tariff ceiling. 138 CONG. REC. E2192-01 (daily ed. July 21,
1992).
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(1988-present). These structural reforms could not have been implemented, how-
ever, had Mexico's budget deficit and inflation not been brought under control.
The rate of inflation was reduced from 132 percent per annum in 1987 to 20
percent in 1989,70 and currently to 14 percent in 1992.11 This was accomplished
by implementing strict monetary and fiscal policies coupled with an extraordinary
agreement between the government, business, and organized labor. Under the
Pact for Economic Solidarity, or the pacto as it is known in Mexico, limitations
were imposed on public sector prices and a freeze was placed on wages with
government price control of certain consumer staples.72 This pact has been
modified and adopted by the Salinas administration as the Pact for Economic
Stability and Growth. 73 Mexico addressed its growing budget deficit by cutting
the share of government spending in Gross National Product from 30 percent to
less than 20 percent. 74 Much of the spending cuts were made in conjunction with
the newly initiated privatization program, which reduced the distribution of
subsidies to uncompetitive private firms and increased competitiveness in state-
owned businesses. 75 Having success in reducing the deficit and inflation, bold
structural change was free to proceed.
Privatization is one aspect of structural change which has progressed steadily
and with beneficial results. In 1982, there were 1,155 state-owned or controlled
businesses. By September 30, 1992, there were only 221 .76 This relieved the
Mexican government of the economic burden tied to these unproductive and
highly subsidized state-owned or controlled businesses. Privatization focused on
both small and large businesses. The sale of Mexicana and Aeromexico airlines
as well as the national telecommunications company Telemex are examples of
the privatization of large businesses. By May 1992, the Mexican government had
raised $18 billion through these and similar sales, and used the revenue to help
reduce internal and external debts. 7 An exception to this practice of privatization
is the Mexican oil industry, for which the Constitution requires complete Mexican
ownership. 7 Nonetheless, privatization has allowed Mexican industry to grow
stronger and more efficient, while further introducing foreign investment into
Mexico.
President Salinas has been given much of the credit for the recent policy
changes embraced by Mexico. The new Foreign Investment Regulations issued by
President Salinas on May 16, 1989, set forth more liberal foreign investment
rules and served as further evidence of his commitment to a new agenda.
70. NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 60, at 18.
71. 139 CONG. REC. E367-03 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1993). A State Department dispatch reports
inflation figures which differ from the above. According to the dispatch, Mexico's inflation was
reduced from 170 percent in 1989 to 19 percent in 1991. Fact Sheet. Mexico, U.S. Department of
State Dispatch (Mar. 2, 1992).
72. 138 CONG. REc. E2192-01 (daily ed. Jul. 21, 1992).
73. NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 60, at 18.
74. While Mexico's budget deficit in 1982 was 16.5 percent of its GDP, today the deficit has
been eliminated. Weintraub, supra note 60, at 559.
75. 138 CONG. REC. E2192-01 (daily ed. Jul. 21, 1992).
76. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION Pun. 2596, POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE
U.S. ECONOMY AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES OF THE NORTH AMERICANFREE-TRADE AGREEMENT 1-10
(1993) [hereinafter POTENTIAL IMPACT].
77. Id. at 1-12.
78. 138 CONG. REC. E2192-01 (daily ed. Jul. 21, 1992).
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Essentially, the regulations permit complete foreign ownership of certain indus-
tries, in addition to current maquiladora arrangements. Later that same year,
President Salinas issued the Maquiladora Law of 1989, which replaced the
Maquiladora Law of 1983. This new law provides incentives to foreign investment
and, in most instances, allows up to 50 percent of the products produced by the
maquiladora to be sold in the Mexican market. The issuance of this law embodies
the changes in Mexican policy which have lead to the proposal of the NAFTA.
When the maquiladora programs were developed, the Mexican government sup-
ported them solely as a means of providing its citizens with employment oppor-
tunities. Foreign investment was merely a necessary evil to be endured. In contrast,
the Maquiladora Law of 1989 openly courts foreign investors. 79 In an address
before the Economic Club of New York President Salinas stated that:
For many years Mexico followed the path of protectionism and was inward-
looking, depending on the domestic market. The crisis of the eighties showed
that this model was outworn. In order to grow it is necessary to export and that
demands competitiveness, technology and access to markets. If a protectionist
view is taken, this does not occur and any drop in economic activity becomes a
collapse, and recession becomes depression. For Mexico it took extraordinary
efforts to open up the economy but it would have been far more serious to insist
on carrying on along the old path.0
President Salinas has encouraged foreign investment"' and opened Mexican mar-
kets in an effort to reverse the backward policy his government once embraced.
B. The Maquiladora Industry
The Mexican maquiladora program involves foreign-owned businesses cre-
ating manufacturing stations in Mexico which assemble foreign made components
for export. The Mexican government created the maquiladora program in 1965
as part of the Mexican Border Industrialization Program in an attempt to avoid
the potentially high unemployment caused by the cancellation of the U.S. Bracero
Program in 1964.2 Typically, maquiladoras are arranged in a twin-plant config-
uration whereby a business establishes a production base in Mexico while the rest
of the company resides in the U.S.83 In part, the significantly lower wages paid
to Mexican workers, when compared to their U.S. counterparts, has enabled
79. Silva & Dunn, supra note 61, at 959.
80. 138 CONG. REC. El-01 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1992).
81. According to a report released on November 3, 1992, by the General Accounting Office, the
U.S. is the largest foreign direct investor in Mexico having invested $21.5 billion, or 63 percent of
total foreign direct investment in Mexico, by the end of 1991. Compare this to Mexico's foreign
direct investment in the U.S. of $608 million, or less than 0.2 percent of total foreign direct investment
in the U.S. NAFTA: U.S. Had Trade Surplus with Mexico in 1991 for First Time Since 1981, GAO
Says, 9 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1932 (Nov. 11, 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA: U.S. Trade Surplus].
82. The U.S. Bracero Program provided Mexican workers with seasonal farm work within the
U.S. In the early 1960's the maquiladora program had its origins in private agreements between U.S.
businesses and Mexican landowners. NAFTA: IssuEs FOR CONGRESS, supra note 60, at 19.
83. Silva & Dunn, supra note 61, at 956. It is projected that in the late 1980's at least 300 of
the "Fortune 500" companies operated maquiladoras. Many of the top manufacturing firms in the
U.S., including General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Rockwell International, General Electric, Lockheed,
Gulfstream Aerospace, Honeywell, Johnson and Johnson, Mattel, and 3M, have maquiladoras. M.
ANGELES VOItREAL, U.S. LIBR. OF CONG., CONG. RES. SERVICES, REPORT No. 91-706E, MEXICO'S
MAQUI.ADORA INDUSTRY 9 (Sept. 27, 1991).
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those U.S. businesses with maquiladoras to decrease their production costs. The
favorable tariff and non-tariff treatment given to maquiladoras makes this
program a model for the effects of free trade on U.S. employment.
The maquiladora program was a forerunner of free trade, and it attracted
foreign business in large part because of the unique rules which governed this
sector of the Mexican work force. Maquiladoras were not required to comply
with Mexican majority ownership laws. Nor were they charged a duty on imported
intermediate materials, so long as all of the assembled products were exported.
The Maquiladora Law of 1989 suspends duty on these materials provided 50
percent of the manufactured products are exported.8 Restrictions on foreign
ownership of real estate near borders and coastlines were also relaxed under the
maquiladora regulations. Finally, subject to minor restrictions, equipment could
,be imported duty free into Mexico for use in maquiladoras. While maquiladoras
were originally required to operate within the border area, today there are plants
throughout Mexico."
U.S. businesses engaging in the maquiladora industry also benefit from
favorable U.S. tariff treatment of maquiladora produced imports. Under provi-
sions 9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States, s6 products manufactured in maquiladoras and shipped to the U.S. are
only assessed duties on value added through the maquiladora process. 7 Other
benefits are realized through the Generalized System of Preferences," which
allows various goods which would otherwise be subject to import duties to be
exempt provided the goods were produced in a developing country. Mexico
qualifies as a developing country under the definition in the GSP. s9 Consequently,
within the context of the maquiladora industry, both the U.S. and Mexico have
already embraced a form of limited free trade.
The maquiladora industry experienced dramatic growth throughout the 1980's
due in part to a reduction in Mexican wages in terms of the dollar caused by a
devaluation of the peso. 90 The number of maquiladoras grew from 620 in 1980
84. VILLARREAL, supra note 83, at 2. On two separate occasions the Mexican government has
relaxed the regulations which govern the maquiladoras. While initially all manufactured products had
to be exported in order to avoid an intermediate material import duty, the 1983 Maquiladora Decree
permitted 20 percent of the finished product to be sold in the domestic market. The second
liberalization of regulations occurred when President Salinas issued the 1989 Maquiladora Decree.
This decree provided that up to'50 percent of the goods manufactured in maquiladoras could be sold
in the domestic market. It also simplified administrative procedures in hopes of expanding the
maquiladora program. Finally, the 1989 decree made maquiladora licenses valid for an indefinite
period,, versus the two-year period previously imposed. The policy behind this change was to create
a more stable setting which would encourage long-term investment. Id.
85. VILARREAL, supra note 83, at 1. Only 17 percent of all maquiladoras are located in Mexico's
interior. Id.
86. Harmonized Tariff Schedule, Pub. L. No. 101-508, Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388 (Nov. 5,
1990) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 40 (Supp. 1992)) [hereinafter HTS].
87. VILLARREAL, supra note 83, at 3.
88. Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, Oct. 30, 1984,
98 Stat. 3018 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) [hereinafter GSPI.
89. NAFTA: IssuEs FOR CONGRESS, supra note 60, at 20. Under the GSP, the second largest
category of products which Mexico exports to the U.S. is machinery. Most of Mexico's manufacturing
of machinery is performed by the maquiladoras. Id.
90. The average hourly Mexican wage in 1988 was $0.98 for the maquiladora industry and $1.99
for the non-maquiladora industries. This is in sharp contrast to the average U.S. hourly manufacturing
wage of $13.85. VILLARREA, supra note 83, at 4.
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to 1,396 in 1988. 91 The maquiladoras employed 3,000 in 1965, and today this
industry employs approximately 500,000. 92 It is important to note that the U.S.
is Mexico's primary trading partner in both imports to the United States and
exports from the United States. Mexico ranks third in imports to the U.S. as
well as being the United States' third largest export market.91 Trade from the
maquiladoras accounted for 36.9 percent of total Mexican exports and 23.4
percent of total Mexican imports in 1991.94 The history of the maquiladora reveals
the potential for free trade between Mexico and the U.S. Ironically, while the
maquiladoras provide us with an idea of what free trade between Mexico and
the U.S. might entail, if the NAFTA is enacted it could mark the demise of the
maquiladora industry. This is because free trade would eliminate import duties
and possibly further liberalize foreign investment restrictions and local content
requirements. 95 Consequently, the same rules would apply to the maquiladora as
well as non-maquiladora industries.
III. PREPARING FOR THE PROBABLE DISLOCATION OF WORKERS
A. The Problem of Worker Dislocation
A combination of lower Mexican wages, less restrictive Mexican labor
practices and Mexico's close proximity to the U.S. has many worried that the
NAFTA will result in U.S. jobs lost to Mexican labor. As illustrated on a smaller
scale with the maquiladora industry, these factors, in conjunction with a further
reduction of Mexican tariff and non-tariff barriers, will result in a stream of
U.S. jobs being sent south of the border. Therefore, regardless of whether
economists predict a projected net gain or loss in U.S. employment, job dislo-
cation is a serious matter which must be addressed.
In response to the debt crisis of 1982, the Mexican government imposed
restrictions on wages, prices and the rate of exchange between the dollar and the
peso. During this same period, a steady appreciation of the dollar also occurred
in relation to other currencies. In terms of the U.S. dollar, the result was a 40
percent decline in Mexican wages between 1981 and 1989. 96 Perhaps not by
coincidence, the number of maquiladoras doubled between 1981 and 1989. The
vast disparity between wages paid to U.S. workers and their Mexican counterparts
as well as the steady expansion of the maquiladora industry has caused many,
especially U.S. labor leaders, 97 to predict that the NAFTA will drive U.S. jobs
south of the border.
91. VnLARuEaL, supra note 83, at 4. In 1965 there were 12 maquiladoras, whereas today there
are over 2,000. Id.
92. NAFTA: IssuEs FOR CONGRESS, supra note 60, at 20.
93. NAFTA: U.S. Trade Surplus, supra note 81, at 2.
94. Id.
95. Vn.LuAL, supra note 83, at 15.
96. NAFTA: IssuEs FOR CONGRESS, supra note 60, at 33.
97. Meeting before the Senate Finance Committee on September 22, 1992, AFL-CIO Secretary-
Treasurer Thomas Donahue stated that the version of NAFTA drafted by the Bush administration
"would lead to the destruction and the export to Mexico of hundreds of thousands of jobs."
Donahue also chairs a labor advisory committee on trade that was established by Congress in 1988.
NAFTA: Labor Urges Congress to Reject Bush Trade Agreement with Mexico, 9 Int'l. Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1644 (Sept. 23, 1992).
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The average hourly wage, including government benefits, paid to Mexican
production workers was $2.17 in 1991, and $1.25 for those working for the
maquiladoras in 1990. When compared with the $15.45 per hour that a U.S.
production worker is paid, the motivation for a business to move its labor-
intensive work to Mexico is apparent.98 Mexico's work force of over 27 million
serves as a vast supply of inexpensive low-skilled labor. Some will argue that the
wage differential is due to the superior productivity of the U.S. worker and
therefore the NAFTA will not provide an incentive for U.S. businesses to engage
the cheaper Mexican work force.9 Although it is true that businesses take many
factors other than average worker wages into account in deciding whether or not
to establish plants in Mexico, it is simply not correct to attribute the disparity
between U.S. and Mexican wages to a difference in productivity.
In fact, the U.S. International Trade Commission's January, 1993 report to
the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Finance cited studies
which concluded that in several key industries Mexican productivity was "con-
verging" on U.S. productivity. For example, the Blomstrom and Wolff analysis
determined that in producing electronic equipment the Mexican worker's produc-
tivity was 83 percent of the productivity of his U.S. counterpart.1°0 In a separate
study performed by Walter Mead for the Economic Policy Institute, it was
similarly determined that workers in a Mexican Ford plant proved to be 80
percent as productive as their U.S. counterparts. The Mexican workers at that
plant were paid 6 percent of the salary that their U.S. counterparts received.' 0'
It therefore would seem that at least in several key industries, U.S. businesses
can pay Mexican workers substantially less than U.S. workers for relatively
equivalent work. Clearly, the growth of the maquiladora industry provides
significant evidence that U.S. jobs are sent to Mexico when U.S. businesses are
given access to cheap labor and are allowed to operate in a free trade setting.
Lax enforcement of labor laws is another factor which prompts U.S. busi-
nesses to establish plants in Mexico. Although Mexican labor standards are
similar to those in the U.S., in practice there are substantial differences. The
Federal Labor Law of 1 May 1970 is the central piece of legislation which
regulates labor contracts, minimum wage, number of hours worked, labor unions,
and a wide variety of other labor related issues. 102 Enforcement is minimal,
however, and disregard of these laws is the norm. Some urge that the free trade
agreement with Mexico should be contingent upon significant changes in its labor
practices. President Clinton mirrored these concerns in a meeting with Mexican
President Salinas, stating: "I don't believe the agreement needs to be reopened,
I do believe there need to be some other agreements. I have made it clear to
98. POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 76, at 1-28.
99. U.S. Trade Representative general counsel, Gary Edson, claimed that with implementation
of a NAFTA U.S. firms would not relocate to Mexico due to lower wages. He said that factors
other than wages, specifically worker productivity, are important to companies considering the move.
NAFTA: USTR's Edson Says NAFTA Will Not Provide Incentive for Firm's Relocation to Mexico,
9 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1900 (Nov. 4, 1992).
100. POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 76, at 1-28.
101. JEFF FAUX & WILLIAM SPRiGGs, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE BRIEFING PAPER, U.S. JOBS AND
THE MEXICAN TRADE PROPOSAL 6 (1991).
102. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 50, at 119.
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President Salinas that there are labor and environmental issues to be dealt with.
I want these other issues addressed." 103 Until substantial changes are made,
Mexican labor practices will serve as an incentive for U.S. businesses to seek
cheaper labor.
Regardless of which employment study you deem valid, dislocation of workers
is an inevitable consequence of the NAFTA.'0 This has been demonstrated on a
relatively small scale with the maquiladora program, and is true whether we
realize a net gain or loss in U.S. employment from the NAFTA. A U.S.
Department of Labor study assessed the potential impact of the NAFTA on U.S.
employment by surveying the repeal of 807.00 of the Tariff Schedules of the
United States. This section created duty-free status for products manufactured
by the maquiladoras prior to HTS 9802.00.80. The result of the study was a
change in U.S. employment somewhere between a gain of 18,000 jobs and a loss
of 16,000 jobs. Assuming that the changes brought about by the NAFTA would
have four times the impact as the above change to the maquiladora program,
we would experience change somewhere between a loss of 69,000 jobs and a gain
of 72,000 jobs.105 According to another analysis performed by Hufbauer and
Schott, approximately 112,000 U.S. workers will be dislocated over several years
as a result of the NAFTA. This is in spite of the study's conclusion that the
NAFTA will create a net gain in employment.'0 Utilizing a modified Hinojosa-
McCleery model, the Economic Policy Institute predicts severe employment
consequences of the NAFTA, and cites that over ten years there will be 550,000
U.S. job dislocations.'07 In light of the increased competition from Mexico that
the NAFTA would place on labor-intensive U.S. jobs, it is imprudent not to
address worker dislocation programs. This should not be viewed as a step
backward for the U.S. workforce, but as an opportunity to increase its high
skill, knowledge-intensive base.1°s The U.S. should compete with the industrial
powers of the world which boast an educated and highly skilled work force, and
not with countries such as Mexico which focus on low wage, labor-intensive
work.' 9
B. Existing Employment Assistance Programs
Lawmakers have already made numerous attempts to help the American
worker adjust to job dislocation." 0 With the influence of labor unions, employ-
103. Clinton Rules Out Reopening NAFTA, But Cites Labor, Environmental Changes, 10 Int'l.
Trade Rep. (BNA) 38 (Jan. 13, 1993).
104. Economist Peter Morici told a Capitol Hill forum sponsored by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies' Congressional Study Group on Mexico that while there may only be minor
changes in overall net U.S. employment, this fact would be of no apparent help to the southern
textile worker who is out of work because of workforce adjustments due to the NAFTA. Economist
Argues Free Trade with Mexico Will Cause Adjustments in U.S. Workforce, 8 Int'l. Trade Rep.
(BNA) 784 (May 22, 1991).
105. HUFBAUER & Scso-r, supra note 50, at 109-10.
106. Id. at 110.
107. FAus & SpiGcs, supra note 101, at 7.
108. Economist Peter Morici told a Capitol Hill forum sponsored by CSIS' Congressional Study
Group on Mexico that free trade with Mexico will allow the U.S. to begin to specialize, and therefore
shift its labor force to higher-skilled jobs. But, such a shift would require that certain resources be
moved. Economist Argues Free Trade With Mexico Will Cause Adjustments in U.S. Workforce, 8
Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 784 (May 22, 1991).
109. Weintraub, supra note 60, at 570.
110. For example, The Trade Worker Adjustment Assistance Act of 1992, proposed by Repre-
sentative Pease (D-Ohio). 138 CONG. REc. H8125 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992).
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ment issues have been pushed to the front of the NAFTA debate."' Legislators
may look at this history as well as existing programs as they attempt to pacify
unemployment concerns.
There are a broad range of assistance programs already in place in the
United States that could be applied to help those workers who may become
unemployed as a result of a free trade agreement with Canada and Mexico. The
largest is unemployment insurance." 2 This program is not targeted to alleviate
unemployment from any specific source, but to assist any unemployed worker
for a limited time. It is a massive program and because it is temporary, it could
not, standing alone, cure the type of dislocation that is anticipated if the NAFTA
becomes effective."13
A second existing program that may help alleviate the pressure on the labor
market created by the NAFTA is the Job Training Partnership Act." 4 The JTPA
provides training along with aid in the search for new employment for any
displaced worker." 5 The program is well utilized and effective; over 234,000
laborers participated in 1989,' 16 and an estimated 70 percent found new employ-
ment.
Another program is Trade Adjustment Assistance" 7 which was designed
specifically to help laborers displaced by the effects of foreign competition." 8 In
its early years, the program was of little consequence due to strict eligibility
requirements. Those requirements were relaxed as part of trade legislation in
1974. Currently, to be entitled to benefits from the program workers must first
show that increased imports created the unemployment and then the worker must
be found eligible for aid." 9 From 1974, when the program was expanded, until
the early 1980's it was well utilized. 20 In 1980, over 684,000 workers qualified
for assistance and over 530,000 received it. By 1989, the numbers were cut back
significantly by the two Republican administrations, to over 89,000 and 23,000,
respectively.' 2 ' The average outlay to those that received assistance was $5,300.
A fourth program that may be used to temper the negative employment
effects of the NAFTA is Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assis-
tance. 22 EDWAA has been effective since 1989 and provides five forms of relief.
11l. See, for example, ALF-CIO Leadership Calls for Major Changes in NAFTA, 10 Int'l. Trade
Rep. (BNA) 311 (Feb. 24, 1993). "[AFL-CIO President] Kirkland said the current proposed trade
agreement would be a 'disaster' for millions of working people. It would destroy jobs, do nothing
to lift the wages of Mexican workers, and ignore the rights of working people ... Id.
112. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 50, at 114.
113. Id. In 1988, the government paid $13.2 billion in benefits; in 1990, it reached 37% of
unemployed workers, a total of 2.5 million people. Id.
114. Job Training Partnership Act, Pub. L. No. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1322 (1982) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 & 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter JTPAJ.
115. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 50, at 115.
116. The average allotment per worker was $1,308. Id.
117. Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform and Extension Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 110
Stat. 300, 304 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) [hereinafter TAAJ.
118. Id. This program was created nearly three decades ago but is topical today in light of the
NAFTA.
119. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR EMPLOYMENT POLICY, THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS AND BACKGROUND STUDIES 66 (1992) [here-
inafter THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF THE NAFTA].
120. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 50, at 117.
121. This amounted to over $3 billion of expenditures in 1980, reduced to a range of $35 million
to $208 million for the balance of the decade. Id.
122. Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1524 (1988) (codified as hmended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter EDWAA].
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First is rapid relief for plant closings and mass lay-offs. Second, it provides job
readjustment, including job counselling and placement. Third, it provides for the
establishment of committees to administer community wide assistance programs.
Fourth, it offers retraining services. Finally, EDWAA provides funds to workers
who have exhausted their access to unemployment insurance or are participating
in retraining programs. 23 EDWAA reached an estimated 500,000 workers in its
first two years and averaged over 67 percent job placement in that period. 124
A final source of relief for displaced workers is WARN. 25 The law requires
large employers to give sixty days notice of their intention to close a plant to
three parties, the factory bargaining representative (or, if the workers are not
unionized, to each affected worker), the state dislocated worker assistance pro-
gram created by JTPA, and the local government.'26 WARN is not an entitlement
program; there are four possible sanctions that may be used against the employer
if the sixty day notice period is violated. First, each employee is entitled to back
pay for each day of the violation. Second, an employer may be forced to pay
certain employee benefits. 27 Third, the violating employer can be subject to civil
penalties of up to $500 per day that the local government was not notified. And
finally the employer may be liable for attorney's fees if a plaintiff succeeds in
an action under WARN. 28
C. A Proposal for Reform to Address the Employment Issue
The means of protecting the low wage laborer in the United States is not to
foreclose competition in that sector of the labor market. Instead the goal should
be to adapt the American work force to the inevitable change that will occur
when free trade with Mexico is realized. Specifically, the U.S. needs to retrain
its unskilled labor. 29 Retraining, however, cannot be considered a panacea; 30 the
123. THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF THE NAFTA, supra note 119, at 67.
124. Id.
125. See supra note 4.
126. John O'Connor, Employers Be Forewarned: An Employer's Guide to Plant Closing and
Layoff Decisions After the Enactment of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act,
16 Osno N.U. L. REV. 19, 45 (1989).
127. Id. at 49. The formula for this penalty is prescribed in section 3(3) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2104(l)(a)(B)(1988).
128. Id. at 49.
129. Weintraub, supra note 60, at 570.
The United States' objective should not be to protect its low-wage, low-competitive
activities, but rather foster those that are skill-intensive, knowledge-intensive, and
technology intensive. These are also high wage-industries.
When looked at in this light, the debate on free trade with Mexico is a side show
on the main arena of United States policy: how to increase the skill capacity of the
nation's labor force and increase its productivity.
Id.
What methods of retraining and re-education would best address the changes brought about by
the NAFTA is a separate topic. See, e.g., HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 50, which claims that
the U.S. should budget at least $900 million over the next five years to assist potentially an additional
112,000 workers displaced by NAFTA. A large portion of these funds should be allocated to worker
retraining. A step in the right direction is the worker training bill (S. 1790, H.R. 3470) which was
introduced inCongress in 1991 and sponsored by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield, House Majority
Leader Gephardt, and Congressman Regula. See also THE EMPLOYMENT EFCTS OF THE NAFTA,
supra note 119, recommending a combination of the Trade Adjustment Assistance program and the
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dislocation created by the NAFTA will require more than entitlements."' This is
especially true in light of the federal budget deficit and its current constraints.
What the authors propose is a hybrid of the existing programs designed to
retroactively provide economic security for displaced workers as well as a proactive
mechanism to give advance notice of change in employment caused by the
NAFTA.
Assuming that laborers will be able to avail themselves to the programs
outlined in the preceding section,3 2 mandatory disclosure is an additional nec-
essary element of worker protection. Mandatory disclosure will allow the diligent
worker enough time to react and prepare for the forthcoming changes. 3
There are at least two ways that disclosure can be implemented. First, a
phase-in period could be applied to labor intensive industries. For example,
legislation could be fashioned to commission a study'3 4 of "NAFTA-sensitive"
industries. The agency conducting these studies would then inform labor in those
sectors prone to job loss. This would trigger the reporting department to imple-
ment a phase-in period for those industries. The phase-in period would grant
workers temporary protection during which time they could prepare for the
Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance program to best cope with worker dislo-
cation brought about by the NAFTA.
130. "If good work is hard to find for [defense] workers, most of them skilled in modern
technologies, what does that portend for the economy of the next decades?" Peter T. Kilborn,
Military Cuts: A Millstone for Ex- Workers, N.Y. TimES, April 5, 1993, at Al. High skills do not
guarantee employment. For example, highly skilled workers in industries that rely on military contracts
are facing wide scale unemployment; an estimated 400,000 jobs have been lost since the military
contraction began in 1989 and an additional 450,000 workers are expected to lose their jobs by 1996.
"Rather than shift from one good job to another, as conversion implies, most [defense industry]
workers find themselves in the same boat as steel and automobile workers, facing month upon month
of unemployment, unstable jobs and sharp cuts in pay." Id.
131. While no one should be asked to assume an inordinate amount of the burden when new
programs create displacement, it is important to note that job displacement as a result of the NAFTA
will not be overwhelming. See supra notes 96 - 109 and accompanying text.
It is also important to note that job displacement will likely occur even in the absence of the
NAFTA. The flow of low wage jobs has already begun and will continue even if Canada, Mexico
and the United States do not complete the agreement. The United States glass industry, for example,
is having trouble competing with their Mexican counterparts even in light of high tariffs in that
sector: "Even with tariffs that currently add up to 38 cents to the cost of each dollar's worth of
imported glass, half the local industry [in West Virginia] has already gone bankrupt in the last
decade, partly because of Mexican competition." Keith Bradsher, An Industry's Winners and Losers
Once a Free-Trade Pact Is Signed, N.Y Trims, July 21, 1992, at Al.
The potential harm attributed to the NAFTA should not be overstated. Weintraub, supra note
60, at 570.
132. Unemployment insurance, JTPA, TAA, and EDWAA. See supra notes 110 - 128 and
accompanying text.
133. Senator Byrd gave a different example:
The President of the United States knows that after January 20 of next year [1989] he
will not be on the public payroll. So he has ample notice and, if he were a first-term
President and running for reelection to be President, on the night of the general election
in November, if he- any President, Democrat or Republican- were unsuccessful in
being reelected, he at least would know that he has until the following January to
remain on the payroll, and I mean public payroll.
Why then should we all not be willing to give that same notice to the steelworkers, to
the coal miners, to the glass workers, to those who work in leather goods plants, textile
workers ....
134 CONG. REC. S8374 (daily ed. Jun. 22, 1988).
134. The Commerce Department and the Department of Labor are two candidates for this
function.
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change. Since the phase-in concept is already a part of the NAFTA, this program
would not appear to be difficult to effectuate.
An alternative, and perhaps a companion program to the phase-in mecha-
nism, is application of WARN' or analogous legislation. Under the current
scheme of WARN, a worker is given up to sixty days notice of a plant closing.
The purpose is to provide enough time for the employee to make alternative
provisions for work. Two months may be adequate for random closures, but for
the scale of change that may result from the NAFTA, more time is needed. The
case with the NAFTA differs from an intra-corporate consolidation of manufac-
turing which might occur when a company shuts down certain facilities, since
entire companies and perhaps entire industries may relocate plants to Mexico.
To address the special circumstance of the NAFTA, the provisions of WARN
need to be changed to grant labor at least six months or perhaps one year of
notice prior to international plant relocation.13 6
The extended notice provision could be enforced through the same mechanism
used by WARN. For example, if the six month or one year notice provision is
violated, a company could be required to pay penalties to those displaced workers
for the duration of the violation. This would encourage long-term corporate
planning, as well as create an incentive for companies to maintain their United
States manufacturing facilities for the statutory period.
Under the prescribed scenario, labor in low-skilled sectors would receive
notice from two sources. First, it would come from the governmental agency
that conducted the study to determine which industries were at risk from free
trade with Mexico. This agency would inform labor of the potential job loss
once the phase-in period had expired')3 7 Second, notice would come from em-
ployers who would be required to give extended notice of their intention to close
plants in the United States. Neither of these programs are entitlements and should
therefore meet with minimal resistance in the law making process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Both the history of the maquiladora industry and current economic analysis
reveal that U.S. workers will be displaced by a free trade agreement with Mexico.
The U.S. must prepare for this impact in such a manner as to help create a
higher-skilled, higher-paid work force. One part of the solution is to provide
sufficient retraining and reeducation to displaced workers. The other necessary
ingredient is to require disclosure from a reporting agency of the United States
135. See supra notes 4, 125-28 and accompanying text. It is clear from the legislative history of
the law that WARN was designed to assist labor that is displaced as a result of foreign competition.
Therefore, there should be little resistance for its application in the present situation. For example,
Senator Byrd stated during the debate: "Mr. President, this adversarial relationship [between man-
agement and labor] does not help America compete in the world. Once we could afford to elbow
each other without worrying about our foreign competition. America dominated the markets of the
free world in the post-World War II era. But that time is passed. America is being out hustled and
out traded by our foreign competition." 134 CONG. REc. S8374 (daily ed. Jun. 22, 1988).
136. Legislation of this sort should be specifically tailored to address plant lay-offs caused by
plant relocation to Canada or Mexico as opposed to lay-offs created by other factors such as intra-
corporate factory consolidation.
137. The same study that recommends industries that qualify for the phase-in could be required
to supply the notice to the workers of those industries.
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government and from those businesses intending to shift operations to Canada
or Mexico. Use of a phase-in period and the application of WARN-type legislation
are two means of accomplishing this much needed disclosure. The U.S. worker
must be provided with the tools to cope with dislocation brought about by the
NAFTA, and the U.S. must use this as an opportunity to upgrade its labor base
to better compete in the global market.
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